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Abstract
I propose a regression approach to recovering the return distribution of an indi-
vidual asset conditional on the return of an aggregate index based on their marginal
distributions. This approach relies on the identifying assumption that the conditional
return distribution of the asset given the index return does not vary over time. I show
how to empirically implement this approach using option price data. I then apply this
approach to examine the cross-sectional equity risk premium associated with system-
atic disaster risk, to estimate the exposure of banks to systemic shocks, and to extend
the Ross (Journal of Finance, 2014) recovery theorem to individual assets.
1 Introduction
The recent nancial crisis has witnessed dramatic declines in the prices of most securities,
which suggests strong return comovement between various assets. It is desirable to under-
stand how the returns of di¤erent securities move along with each other. In this paper,
I propose a regression approach to recovering the return distribution of an individual as-
set conditional on the return of an aggregate index based on their marginal distributions.
I thank Jason Donaldson, Phil Dybvig, George Jiang, Ohad Kadan, Isaac Kleshchelski, Jeongmin Lee,
Mark Loewenstein, Asaf Manela, Thomas Maurer, Giorgia Piacentino, Matthew Ringgenberg, Stephen
Ross, Ngoc-Khanh Tran, Guofu Zhou, as well as seminar participants at the Institute of Financial Studies
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helpful comments and suggestions.
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I show how this approach can be implemented empirically using option prices. I then
demonstrate the usefulness of this approach in testing the cross-sectional equity premium
associated with systematic disaster risk, in estimating the exposure of banks to systemic
shocks, and in an extension of the Ross (2014) recovery theorem.
The simplest and most widely used approach to describing the joint return behavior
between two securities is to run a linear regression based on their historical returns. In-
deed, this is what we are used to doing when estimating the CAPM beta by regressing
excess returns of an asset on those of the market portfolio. This approach, however, has
a number of drawbacks. First, it estimates the mean return of one security conditional
on the return of the other, but it fails to capture high-moment properties. For example,
Figure 1 plots the returns of two pairs of hypothetical securities, both of which predict
the same conditional mean return of one security given the return of the other. However,
the second-moment patterns of the two pairs are clearly distinct in the sense that the rst
pair has increasing correlation when the returns become lower, whereas the second pair has
symmetric correlation over the entire region of returns. Second, running a linear regression
between the two securities focuses on the linear relation only, neglecting other aspects of
their joint behavior. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 depicts the returns of two hypothet-
ical assets against the return of the market portfolio. The returns of both assets t the
same linear relation with the market return. Nevertheless, the nonlinear patterns show
that asset 1 is more sensitive to the market disaster risk than asset 2 in the sense that
the former tends to deliver lower returns when the market return becomes disastrously
low. Third, estimation based on historical returns is backward-looking, which does not
necessarily represent future return distributions. Finally, using historical returns makes it
di¢ cult to capture the e¤ects of rare events, especially when the sample size is not large
enough.
Alternative approaches used in the literature resolve some of the above issues. One
such approach is the quantile regression, which predicts the conditional return quantiles
of one security given the return of the other. (See Koenker (2005) for detailed discussions
on quantile regression.) This approach generates the entire conditional distributions, thus
capturing high-moment properties as well as nonlinear aspects in the joint return behavior.
Nevertheless, given that the quantile regression is also implemented using historical returns,
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it is backward-looking and does not adequately reect the e¤ects of rare events.
Another alternative relies on option prices. We learn from the results of Ross (1976)
and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) that one can estimate the risk-neutral probability
distribution of security returns using prices of options written on the security under con-
sideration. The advantage of using option prices is that it is forward-looking and accounts
for rare events even if such events do not occur within sample. However, the risk-neutral
distributions obtained from option prices typically di¤er from the physical distributions
due to the adjustment for risk aversion. In addition, if we are interested in the joint return
distribution of two securities, we would need options written on the joint values of these
two securities. Given that most traded options are written on a single security, this method
generally allows one to estimate the risk-neutral marginal return distribution of each single
security, but not their joint distribution.
A question that follows naturally is whether we can recover the joint return distribution
of two securities, assuming that the associated marginal distributions are known or can be
estimated. This is indeed straightforward in the special cases in which the returns of the
two securities are perfectly correlated or independent of each other. For more general cases,
a well-known tool for this purpose is the copula, which can be used to map the marginal
return distributions of multiple securities to their joint distribution. (See Nelsen (1999) for
a general overview of the copula method.) However, a drawback of this approach is that it
is parametric in the sense that it typically relies on specifying a particular class of copulas.
When the copula class is misspecied, the accuracy of estimation might be a¤ected.
In light of all the problems discussed above, it is desirable to have a better approach
to evaluating the joint return behavior of two di¤erent securities. The term better
includes the following aspects. First, it should capture all moment properties of the joint
return distribution. Second, it should capture linear as well as nonlinear relations in the
returns of the two securities. Third, it should reect forward-looking information. Fourth,
it should naturally account for rare events, whose ex-ante probabilities of occurrence are
extremely small. Finally, it should not depend on any parametric assumptions on the
return distributions of the securities.
I propose a novel approach of recovering the conditional return distribution of an indi-
vidual asset given the return of an aggregate index from their marginal distributions. The
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index return can be viewed as a factor that determines the state of the economy. Examples
of the aggregate index include the market portfolio or a sector portfolio, etc. According
to the total probability formula, the marginal return distributions of the two securities are
linked to each other through the conditional return distribution of the asset given the index
return. I assume that the conditional return distribution of the asset given any particular
value of the index return remains xed over time, meaning that the time variation in the
return distribution of the asset is solely driven by that of the index. This allows me to
estimate the time-invariant conditional return probabilities of the asset as the coe¢ cients
from a constrained linear regression of the marginal return distribution of the asset on that
of the index over time. I show that under the standard OLS assumptions, the estimates
from this constrained regression are consistent, i.e., they converge to the true conditional
probabilities as the sample size becomes large enough.
I further assume that the variation in the index return is the only priced risk (systematic
risk) such that any variation left in the asset return is idiosyncratic and does not get priced.
This implies that the conditional return distribution of the asset given the index return is
the same under the physical and the risk-neutral probability measures. Since risk-neutral
marginal distributions of security returns can be extracted from option prices, my approach
can be implemented under the risk-neutral measure using option pricing data. The resulting
conditional return distribution of the asset estimated this way coincides with the physical
conditional distribution.
The advantages of my approach include the following. First, it generates the entire
conditional return distribution of the asset given the index return, thus capturing all mo-
ment properties and potential nonlinearity in their joint behavior. In addition, since this
approach can be implemented using option prices, it is forward-looking and accounts for
the likelihood of rare events perceived by investors even if such events do not truly occur
within sample. Finally, this approach does not rely on any parametric assumptions on the
return distributions of the two securities.
I then study three important applications of my approach. In the rst application, I
examine the cross-sectional equity premium associated with the sensitivity of stock returns
to the market disaster risk. To capture this sensitivity, I construct a systematic disaster
riskmeasure based on the conditional return distribution of a stock given the return of
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the market proxied by the S&P500 index. For both the market and the individual stocks,
I dene a normalstate and a disasterstate. Then, the systematic disaster risk of each
stock is dened as the di¤erence in the conditional disaster probabilities of the stock given
that the market is in the disaster versus the normal states, respectively. This measure
captures the extent to which an individual stock is more likely to be hit by a rare disaster
when the market moves from the normal state to the disaster state.
Intuitively, if a stock is more sensitive to the market disaster risk, then it should be
less desirable for investors to hold, especially during time periods when a market crash
is considered likely. As such, investors should require higher expected returns for holding
stocks with higher systematic disaster risk, and this e¤ect should be more pronounced
when the market disaster risk is high. To test this hypothesis, I apply the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) methodology. I nd that systematic disaster risk is not priced when the
option implied market disaster risk is low. However, when I restrict attention to time
periods during which a market crash is perceived likely, then I nd strong evidence that
stocks with higher systematic disaster risk earn signicantly higher expected returns after
controlling for well documented risk factors. In fact, increasing the systematic disaster risk
by one standard deviation raises expected monthly stock returns by 63 basis points, which
is equivalent to over 7% per year.
My second application turns to the banking sector. I ask the question of how to estimate
the exposure of banks to systemic shocks and what bank characteristics are related to banks
systemic exposure. To this end, I construct a systemic exposuremeasure based on the
conditional return distribution of a bank given the banking sector return, where the sector
portfolio is empirically proxied by the KBW Bank Index. For both the sector portfolio and
the individual banks, I dene a normalstate and a disasterstate. I then estimate the
systemic exposure of each bank as the di¤erence in the conditional disaster probabilities
of the bank given that the sector is in the disaster versus the normal states, respectively.
Intuitively, the systemic exposure measure captures by how much an individual bank is
more likely to experience a disaster when the whole banking sector falls from the normal
state to the disaster state.
My estimates show that the systemic exposure measure is typically positive, indicating
that banks are generally more likely to experience a disaster when the banking sector as
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a whole is in the disaster state relative to when the sector performs normally. I also nd
that the systemic exposure of a bank increases with its equity beta and the total return
volatility. It is also increasing in the non-interest to interest income ratio, reecting that
a banks exposure to systemic shocks is largely driven by its non-traditional businesses.
In addition, there is some evidence that systemic exposure decreases with total market
capitalization.
Finally, in the third application I explore an extension of the recent Ross (2014) recovery
theorem, which is aimed to recover the physical return distribution of the market portfolio
from the corresponding risk-neutral distribution. While the recovery theorem deals with
the market portfolio only, I seek to extend it to recover the physical return distribution
of an individual asset. I show that this can be achieved through the risk-neutral joint
return distribution of the asset with the market portfolio, which is given by the product
of the risk-neutral marginal return distribution of the market and the conditional return
distribution of the asset given the market return. Since my approach generates an estimate
for this conditional return distribution, it lends itself naturally to the extension of the Ross
recovery theorem to individual assets.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section
3 introduces the setup, linking the return distribution of an individual asset to that of
an aggregate index. Section 4 discusses the estimation methodology and how it can be
implemented using option prices. Section 5 provides some discussions and extensions.
Section 6 applies the framework to examine the cross-sectional systematic disaster risk
premium. Section 7 studies banksexposure to systemic shocks. Section 8 shows how my
approach can be used to extend the Ross recovery theorem to individual assets. Section 9
concludes. Proofs of propositions are shown in Appendix A, and other technical discussions
are delegated to Appendix B.
2 Literature Review
The paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, it adds to the study of
the joint return behavior of di¤erent securities. Roll (1988), Jorion (2000), and Longin
and Solnik (2001), among others, show that the return correlation between securities is
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not symmetric under all market conditions, but instead increases during market crashes.
Ang and Chen (2002), Hong, Tu and Zhou (2007), and Jiang, Wu and Zhou (2014) de-
velop methods to test this asymmetric dependence between security returns. Skinzi and
Refenes (2004) and Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2013) propose methods of inferring
equity return correlations from option prices. In this paper, I provide a novel approach
of estimating the entire conditional return distribution of an asset given the return of an
aggregate index, thus accounting for potential asymmetries in their joint behavior. In ad-
dition, this approach captures all moment properties of their joint distribution, which is
beyond the return correlation alone.
The paper also adds to the extensive literature on estimating the risk-neutral dis-
tributions of security returns using option pricing data. Ross (1976) and Breeden and
Litzenberger (1978) rst show that one can extract the risk-neutral probability distribu-
tions of security returns from option prices. Since option prices are available at discrete
strike prices and maturities only, some smoothing techniques are needed to estimate the
full risk-neutral distribution. (See Melick and Thomas (1997), Posner and Milevsky (1998),
and Rubinstein (1998) for parametric methods and Shimko (1993), Jackwerth and Rubin-
stein (1996), Malz (1997), and Ait-Sahalia and Lo (1998) for non-parametric methods.)
Jackwerth (1999) provides a comprehensive review on various methods used to extract the
risk-neutral return distributions from option prices. Figlewski (2010) provides an empirical
demonstration based on the U.S. market portfolio. Overall, the literature has restricted
attention to the return distributions of single securities. My paper extends this literature
by introducing an approach of estimating the conditional return distribution of an asset
given the return of an aggregate index using option prices. Under the assumption that the
variation in the index return is the only priced risk, the risk-neutral conditional distribution
estimated from option prices coincides with the physical conditional distribution.
This paper is also related to research on equity premium associated with disaster risk.
A large body of theoretical research shows that investors are averse to rare disasters (e.g.,
Barro (2006, 2009), Gabaix (2008, 2012), Gourio (2012), Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012),
and Wachter (2013)). Consistent with this, a number of empirical papers have documented
a positive relation between disaster risk and expected market returns (e.g., Bali, Demirtas,
and Levy (2009), Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), and Jiang and Kelly (2013)). Cross-
7
sectionally, Siriwardane (2013) studies the relation between expected asset returns and the
option-implied disaster risk of assets, and nds a positive premium. Van Oordt and Zhou
(2012), Jiang and Kelly (2013), Ruenzi and Weigert (2013), on the other hand, focus on
the systematic portion of disaster risk by looking at the disaster risk of an asset in relation
to that of the market. Given the challenge of estimating the joint disaster risk due to
the rare occurrence of disastrous events, all three papers use historical equity returns and
resort to either the power law distribution or parametric copulas to model the tails, which
unfortunately does not necessarily represent the true probability distributions. My paper
contributes to this literature by suggesting a measure of systematic disaster risk based on
the conditional return distribution of an asset given the market return. Since the measure
is estimated using option prices, it is forward-looking and naturally captures rare disasters.
This measure reects investorsperceived sensitivity of asset returns to the market disaster
risk, which can be conveniently used to test the cross-sectional disaster risk premium.
This paper also adds to the literature on bank systemic risk. By denition, systemic risk
focuses on risk associated with the collapse of the entire banking system. Hence, the main
challenge of estimating systemic risk comes from the rare occurrence of disastrous events.
Di¤erent methods have been proposed to tackle this problem. For example, Huang, Zhou,
and Zhu (2009) measure systemic risk by the price of insurance against nancial distress,
in which the default correlation between banks is proxied by the equity return correlation.
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010) propose the systemic expected short-
fall (SES) measure, which estimates the propensity of a bank to be undercapitalized when
the system as a whole is undercapitalized. In particular, their method relies on the power
law distribution to model the tails. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) propose the CoV aR
measure as the di¤erence between the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional on
an individual bank being in distress and the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional
on the bank being solvent. Empirical estimation of CoV aR uses quantile regression to
capture the tail distributions. The contribution of my paper is that it provides a measure
of banks exposure to systemic shocks based on the conditional return distribution of a
bank given the banking sector return. Since this measure is estimated using option prices,
it is forward-looking and naturally captures investors perceived exposure of a bank to
sector-wide disastrous shocks even if such shocks do not occur within sample.
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Finally, the paper also contributes to the literature on Ross (2014) recovery theorem,
which recovers the physical probability distribution of the market return from the associ-
ated risk-neutral distribution. Subsequent research has been done to further explore this
problem. Carr and Yu (2012) provide alternative assumptions that allow for recovery for
di¤usions on a bounded state space. Huang and Shaliastovich (2013) develop a recursive-
utility framework to separately identify physical probabilities and risk adjustments. Martin
and Ross (2013) show that recovery can indeed be e¤ected by observing the behavior of the
long end of the yield curve. Walden (2013) extends the Ross recovery result to unbounded
di¤usion processes. See also Dubynskiy and Goldstein (2013) and Boroviµcka, Hansen and
Scheinkman (2014) for criticism of the Ross recovery theorem. This literature primarily
focuses on the market portfolio. My approach contributes to this literature by extending
the recovery results to any individual asset through its risk-neutral joint return distribution
with the market.
3 Setup
In this section, I introduce a simple setup that links the return distribution of an individual
asset with that of an aggregate index through the total probability formula. The return of
the aggregate index can be viewed as a factor that determines the state of the economy.
Examples of the index include the market portfolio or a sector portfolio, etc. The next
section will discuss how this setup allows me to estimate the conditional return distribution
of the asset given the index return by a regression approach.
There are T discrete time points t 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Tg. At any time t; I consider security
returns over one period ahead, that is, from t to t+ 1:
Consider an aggregate index I; whose return over any one period can take N values 
rI (1) ; rI (2) ; : : : ; rI (N)

:
Denote by ~rIt;t+1 the random return of the index over the period from t to t+ 1: Evaluated
at time t; the probability distribution of ~rIt;t+1 is given by the vector
pIt;t+1 =
 
pIt;t+1 (1) ; p
I
t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; p
I
t;t+1 (N)

;
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where pIt;t+1 (n) represents the probability of ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n) for any n 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng :
Consider an asset, whose return over any one period can take K distinct values
(r (1) ; r (2) ; : : : ; r (K)) :
Denote by ~rt;t+1 the random return of the asset over the period from t to t+ 1: Evaluated
at t; the probability distribution of ~rt;t+1 is given by the vector
pt;t+1 = (pt;t+1 (1) ; pt;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; pt;t+1 (K)) ;
where pt;t+1 (k) represents the probability of ~rt;t+1 = r (k) for any k 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Kg :
Assumption 1 (Identifying) The conditional probability distribution of the asset return
given any value of the contemporaneous index return does not vary over time.
This assumption may be understood in relation to the one we make when empirically
estimating the CAPM beta that the conditional mean return of an asset given any value
of the market return is xed over time. My assumption is stronger in the sense that it
requires not only the conditional mean but indeed the entire conditional distribution to
be time-invariant. It implies that the time variation in the return distribution of the asset
(pt;t+1) is solely driven by the time variation in the return distribution of the index (pIt;t+1).
Denote the time-invariant conditional distribution of the asset return given the index
return by the matrix
 =
0B@  (1j1)     (Kj1)... . . . ...
 (1jN)     (KjN)
1CA ;
where  (kjn) stands for the conditional probability of ~rt;t+1 = r (k) given ~rIt;t+1 = rI (n)
evaluated at the beginning of the period for any n 2 f1; 2; : : : ; Ng and k 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Kg :
By Assumption 1,  does not depend on time. According to the properties of conditional
probabilities, it must be that given any value of the index return, the conditional proba-
bilities of the asset return sum up to one, i.e.,
KX
k=1
 (kjn) = 1; 8n: (1)
10
At any t; the marginal return distribution of the asset is related to that of the index
by the total probability formula. Specically, for any k;
pt;t+1 (k) =
NX
n=1
pIt;t+1 (n)  (kjn) :
That is, the marginal distribution of the asset return is equal to the weighted average of
its conditional distribution given the index return, with the weights given by the marginal
return distribution of the index. This can be conveniently rewritten in matrix form as
pt;t+1 = p
I
t;t+1  : (2)
The discussion so far is based on the physical probability measure. I now make an
additional assumption to link the physical measure with the risk-neutral measure.
Assumption 2 The variation in the index return is the only priced (systematic) risk.
Formally, Assumption 2 is satised if there exists a stochastic discount factor, whose
value related to future payo¤s depends on the future value of the index return only. This
assumption can be understood in relation to the CAPM framework, which implies that the
stochastic discount factor is a linear function of the market return. Assumption 2 is weaker
in the sense that it requires the stochastic discount factor to be a function of the index
return only, but it does not impose any restriction on the functional form of this relation.
This assumption implies that conditional on a particular value of the index return, any
variation left in the asset return is purely idiosyncratic and hence is risk-neutrally priced. It
is then straightforward to show that the conditional distribution of the asset return given
any value of the index return is the same under both the physical and the risk-neutral
probability measures. This is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 At any time t; the risk-neutral conditional probability of ~rt;t+1 = r (k)
given ~rIt;t+1 = r
I (n) is equal to  (kjn) for all n and k:
A conclusion of Proposition 1 is that the total probability formula (2) holds just as well
under the risk-neutral probability measure with respect to the same conditional probability
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matrix . At time t; denote the risk-neutral distributions of ~rt;t+1 and ~rIt;t+1 by
qIt;t+1 =
 
qIt;t+1 (1) ; q
I
t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; q
I
t;t+1 (N)

;
qt;t+1 = (qt;t+1 (1) ; qt;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; qt;t+1 (K)) :
Formally,
Corollary 1 At any time t;
qt;t+1 = q
I
t;t+1  : (3)
4 Estimation Methodology
The setup introduced in Section 3 can be used to estimate the conditional distribution
matrix  from the marginal return distributions of the two securities. Proposition 1 and
Corollary 1 suggest that for this purpose one can work under either the physical measure or
the risk-neutral measure, and the conditional probabilities obtained under both measures
would be identical. In practice, there can be di¤erent ways of estimating the marginal
return distributions in either probability measure. In this paper, I choose to do so under
the risk-neutral measure using option prices based on the work of Ross (1976) and Breeden
and Litzenberger (1978). My approach would work in the same manner if the marginal
return distributions are obtained using other methods.
I assume that both index I and the individual asset of interest are traded in the option
market. Examples of aggregate indices with traded options include the S&P500 index and
the KBW Bank Index, etc. The procedure of estimating  includes two steps. In the rst,
I extract the risk-neutral marginal return distributions of the index and the asset, qIt;t+1
and qt;t+1; from option prices. Then in the second step, I perform a constrained regression
of qt;t+1 on qIt;t+1 over time to estimate the conditional distribution matrix . Below I
discuss each of the two steps separately.
4.1 Extracting Risk-Neutral Marginal Distributions from Option Prices
I rst discuss how the risk-neutral return distributions qIt;t+ and qt;t+ can be extracted
from option prices. The estimation procedures for qIt;t+1 and qt;t+1 are parallel, and hence
in this section I focus on qt;t+1 for brevity.
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Ross (1976) and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) show that given a continuous range of
strike prices covering all possible values of the underlying asset at maturity, the entire risk-
neutral probability distribution of the assets future value can be estimated from European
option prices. Suppose that t is the current time point and consider an European put
option that matures at time t + 1: Let St represent the current price of the underlying
asset, and let ~St+1 be the random price of the asset in one period. Denote the strike price
of the option by X and the risk-free rate by rf : The price of the put option can then be
expressed as a function of the strike price:
Put (X) = e rf
Z 1
0
(X   St+1)+ dF (St+1) (4)
= e rf
Z X
0
(X   St+1) dF (St+1) ;
where F () is the risk-neutral cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ~St+1 evaluated at
time t: Di¤erentiating (4) with respect to X obtains
@Put (X)
@X
= e rfF (X) :
Solving for F (X) leads to
F (X) = erf
@Put (X)
@X
: (5)
Evaluating F (X) at all possible values of X thus yields the entire risk-neutral distribution
of the asset price at maturity.1
Since I am interested in the risk-neutral distribution of the asset return from time t to
t+ 1, I need to relate the return to the price at maturity. Assume that the dividend yield
paid by the asset from t to t+ 1 is equal to d: Then, the return of the asset ~rt;t+1 is related
to the future asset price ~St+1 according to the following approximation
~St+1 = St (1 + ~rt;t+1   d) : (6)
Therefore, the risk-neutral CDF of the asset return is given by 8r;
G (r) = F (St (1 + r   d)) :
1One can alternatively estimate F () based on prices of European call options. By the call-put parity,
the results using call and put options are identical. For simplicity, I choose to work with put options.
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Section 3 assumed that the asset return took a nite number (K) of values. This,
however, is a simplication of the real world in which asset returns have continuous ranges.
To be consistent with the setup, I discretize the continuous asset return by dividing its
range into K mutually disjoint intervals with K   1 thresholds. At each time t; the risk-
neutral probabilities that the one-period asset return lies in each of these K intervals are
taken as elements of the vector qt;t+1: In particular, let rr (1) ; rr (2) ; : : : ; rr (K   1) denote
the K 1 thresholds separating the K intervals of the asset return. Then, the vector qt;t+1
can be estimated as
qt;t+1 (1) = G (rr (1)) ;
qt;t+1 (k) = G (rr (k)) G (rr (k   1)) ; 8k = 2; 3; : : : ;K   1;
qt;t+1 (K) = 1 G (rr (K   1)) :
Two additional technical issues need to be dealt with for the empirical estimation
of qt;t+1. First, the estimation of the risk-neutral CDF (5) relies on di¤erentiating the
option price with respect to the strike price. Since it is generally very di¢ cult to obtain a
close-form expression for this derivative, I estimate it by linear approximation. A second
empirical challenge has to do with obtaining European option prices. Nearly all individual
stock options are American options. While indices are generally represented by European
options, the market option prices are only available at discrete values of the strike price and
time to maturity. To obtain the European option price for any security at any arbitrary
point, I adopt a simple and commonly used approach of rst tting the implied volatility
surface by kernel smoothing and then deriving the Black-Merton-Scholes (BMS) option
price (Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973)) using the tted volatility. I delegate
detailed discussions of these issues to Appendix B.
4.2 Estimating Conditional Distributions by Constrained Regression
This section discusses how to estimate the conditional distribution matrix  based on the
marginal return distributions qIt;t+ and qt;t+ : Since q
I
t;t+ and qt;t+ are extracted from
option prices, they are often subject to measurement errors. In particular, since options
written on individual assets are more thinly traded than index options, one would expect
qt;t+ to be much noisier than qIt;t+ : To reect the di¤erent degrees of noisiness in q
I
t;t+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and qt;t+ ; I assume that qIt;t+ can be accurately estimated and that qt;t+ contains noises,
which are captured by an error term
t;t+1 = (t;t+1 (1) ; t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; t;t+1 (K)) :
Now the risk-neutral total probability formula (3) becomes
qt;t+1 = q
I
t;t+1   + t;t+1: (7)
I will estimate  from qIt;t+ and qt;t+ using a constrained linear regression based on
(7). Before discussing the detailed estimation procedures, I need to make some additional
assumptions, which are su¢ cient to maintain the consistency of my estimates. In particular,
I assume the following.
Assumption 3 The pair of vectors

qIt;t+1;qt;t+1
	
are jointly stationary and weakly de-
pendent over time.2
Assumption 4 At any time t; E

t;t+1 (k) jqIt;t+1

= 0 for all k 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Kg ; where
the expectation is taken under the physical probability measure.
Assumption 5 The T N matrix
QI =
0BBB@
qI1;2
qI2;3
...
qIT;T+1
1CCCA
is of rank N:
To see how  can be estimated by linear regression, it is useful to rewrite (7) as
qt;t+1 (k) =
NX
n=1
qIt;t+1 (n)  (kjn) + t;t+1 (k) ; 8k:
This indicates that one can estimate ( (kj1) ;  (kj2) ; : : : ;  (kjN))0 (the kth column of the
conditional distribution matrix ) by running an OLS regression of qt;t+1 (k) on the vector
2The pair of vectors

qIt;t+1;qt;t+1
	
are weakly dependent over time if for any t;

qIt;t+1;qt;t+1
	
and
qIt+t;t+t+1;qt+t;t+t+1
	
become approximately independent as t!1:
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pIt;t+1 over time. Assumptions 35 guarantee that the resulting OLS estimates are con-
sistent, i.e., they converge to the true parameter values when the sample size approaches
innity.
Then, to estimate the entire  matrix, a natural idea would be to run a total of K
regressions corresponding to each of the K values of the asset return. However, since 
represents the conditional probabilities, two implicit constraints must be satised. First is
that the conditional probabilities given any value of the index return must sum up to one
(as required by (1)), and the second constraint says that all elements of  must lie between
0 and 1, i.e., 0   (kjn)  1 for all k and n. Unfortunately, running K OLS regressions
independently does not guarantee that these constraints are satised.
A solution to this issue is to conduct the K regressions jointly subject to the above two
constraints. Formally, dene
Q =
0BBB@
q1;2
q2;3
...
qT;T+1
1CCCA ;
 =
0B@ 1;2 (1)    1;2 (K)... . . . ...
T;T+1 (1)    T;T+1 (K)
1CA ;
and let 1ab and 0ab denote the a b matrices of ones and zeros for any positive integers
a and b, respectively. Then, the problem can be represented by the following constrained
linear regression
Q = QI   + ; (8)
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
0NK    1NK :
I denote the resulting estimates from problem (8) by ^T ; where the subscript T reects
dependence of the estimates on the sample size.
A priori, it is not clear whether imposing the constraints would a¤ect the consistency of
my estimation. The following proposition establishes that consistency is indeed preserved
in the presence of the constraints.
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Proposition 2 Under Assumptions 3-5, ^T is a consistent estimator of , i.e., limT!1 ^T =
:
5 Discussions and Extensions
This section provides some discussions and extensions of the estimation framework intro-
duced above.
5.1 Elaboration on Key Assumptions
Assumptions 1 and 2 are key to my approach in that they point out two important roles
of the index return.
Assumption 1 states that the conditional return distribution of the asset given the index
return is time invariant. The intuition is that while the return distribution of the asset can
change over time, its variation is solely driven by the time variation in the distribution of
the index return. In particular, once the index return is xed, the conditional distribution
of the asset return is also xed, regardless of the time point under consideration. This is the
identifying assumption of my approach in that it allows me to make use of the time series
information on the marginal return distributions of the two securities to determine the
time-invariant conditional probabilities. Without this assumption, my estimation model is
not identied.
Another important role of the index return is reected in Assumption 2, which states
that the variation in the index return is the only priced (systematic) risk. As such, xing a
certain value of the index return, any variation left of the asset return is purely idiosyncratic
and is thus risk-neutrally priced. This assumption implies that the conditional return
distribution of the asset given the index return is the same under the physical and the risk-
neutral probability measures. Since investors are averse to risk, security return distributions
generally di¤er under the physical versus the risk neutral measures to reect the adjustment
for risk aversion. In fact, there is a recent literature on Ross (2014) recovery theorem
that aims to recover the physical return distributions from the associated risk-neutral
distributions. The benet of Assumption 2 is that it aligns the analyses under the two
probability measures once I condition on a particular value of the index return. This
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allows me to perform empirical estimation under the risk-neutral measure using option
prices, and the resulting conditional probabilities would be exactly the same as if I work
under the physical measure. However, the failure of this assumption does not necessarily
invalidate my approach. Even when this assumption is violated (e.g., when the Fama-
French three-factor pricing model holds), my approach can still be applied under either the
physical or the risk-neutral measure, but the conditional distribution of the asset return
would no longer be the same under the two probability measures.
5.2 Multi-Factor Framework
The baseline model discussed earlier is a one-factor framework, in which the index return
is the only factor that determines the asset return distributions. In practice, asset return
distributions can be a¤ected by more than one factor. Macroeconomic variables such as
the consumption growth rate, ination rate, or VIX may serve as additional factors. In
this case, I need to extend my model into a multi-factor framework.
Suppose that there exist M factors. Each factor m 2 f1; 2; : : : ;Mg takes Nm values.
Evaluated at time t; the joint distribution of the M factors at time t + 1 is given by the
joint distribution function pIt;t+1
 
n1; n2; : : : ; nM

; where nm 2 1; 2; : : : ; NM	 for every
m: Similar to Assumption 1, I assume that given any set of joint values of these M factors,
the conditional return distribution of an asset does not vary over time, which is denoted
by the conditional distribution function 
 jn1; n2; : : : ; nM : Then, the total probability
formula links the marginal return distribution of the asset to the joint distribution of the
M factors through 
 jn1; n2; : : : ; nM, i.e.,
pt;t+1 (k) =
N1X
n1=1
N2X
n2=1
: : :
NMX
nM=1
pIt;t+1
 
n1; n2; : : : ; nM


 
kjn1; n2; : : : ; nM :
If I further assume that variations in theseM factors constitute the only priced (systematic)
risk (the multi-factor version of Assumption 2), then 
 jn1; n2; : : : ; nM is the same under
the physical and the risk-neutral measures. This allows me to write down the risk-neutral
total probability formula as
qt;t+1 (k) =
N1X
n1=1
N2X
n2=1
: : :
NMX
nM=1
qIt;t+1
 
n1; n2; : : : ; nM


 
kjn1; n2; : : : ; nM ;
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where qIt;t+1
 
n1; n2; : : : ; nM

represents the risk-neutral joint distribution of the M factors
at t+ 1 evaluated at time t:
If I have the marginal return distribution of the asset and the joint distribution of the
factors under either the physical or the risk neutral measure, I can estimate the conditional
distribution function 
 
kjn1; n2; : : : ; nM by regressing the former on the latter over time,
as in the baseline framework. Unfortunately, the risk-neutral joint distribution of the
factors can no longer be directly extracted from option prices, because options written on
the joint values of multiple factors are generally not available. As a result, one need to
resort to other approaches to obtain the joint distribution of the factors. Once this joint
distribution is obtained, I can estimate 
 
kjn1; n2; : : : ; nM in exactly the same manner as
in the baseline case.
5.3 Continuous Security Returns
Up till now, I have assumed that the returns of both the individual asset and the aggregate
index take a nite number of discrete values. This section considers the case of continuous
security returns. Given the analogy between the physical and risk-neutral analyses (as in
the baseline case), in this section I work directly with the risk-neutral measure.
At any time t; suppose that the one-period index return ~rIt;t+1 and the one-period asset
return ~rt;t+1 take continuous values from the interval [ 1;1): The marginal probability
distributions of ~rIt;t+1 and ~rt;t+1 are given by the density functions q
I
t;t+1 () and qt;t+1 () ;
respectively. By Assumption 1, given any value of ~rIt;t+1 the conditional distribution of
~rt;t+1 does not change over time. I denote this time-invariant conditional distribution by
the conditional density function  (j) ; which integrates to 1 given any ~rIt;t+1 = rI , i.e.,Z 1
 1

 
rjrI dr = 1; 8rI :
At any t; the marginal return distributions of the two securities are linked to each other
by the total probability formula
qt;t+1 (r) =
Z 1
 1
qIt;t+1
 
rI


 
rjrI drI :
Assume that qIt;t+1 () can be accurately measured, whereas qt;t+1 () is subject to noises,
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which are captured by the error term t;t+1 () : Then, the total probability formula becomes
qt;t+1 (r) =
Z 1
 1
qIt;t+1
 
rI


 
rjrI drI + t;t+1 (r) :
Since 
 
rjrI is innite-dimensional, its empirical estimation is di¢ cult without further
information on the structure of 
 
rjrI :While there are di¤erent ways of reducing dimen-
sionality, one of the simplest methods is to make parametric assumptions on the functional
form of 
 
rjrI : Specically, let

 
rjrI = g  r; rI ; ;
where g
 
r; rI ;

is the assumed functional form of 
 
rjrI and  represents the parameters
of choice. Then, one can estimate 
 
rjrI by choosing the values of  to solve the following
least square problem:
min

 
TX
t=1
Z 1
 1

qt;t+1 (r) 
Z 1
 1
qIt;t+1
 
rI

g
 
r; rI ;

drI
2
dr
!
;
s:t:Z 1
 1
g
 
r; rI ;

dr = 1; 8rI ;
g
 
r; rI ;
  0; 8rI ; r:
5.4 Alternative Econometric Models
In Section 4.2, I used a constrained linear regression to estimate the conditional distribution
matrix  from the marginal return distributions of the two securities. In fact, there are
some alternative econometric models (rather than the constrained linear regression) that
may also seem appealing for my purpose. I discuss the potentials and limitations of some
alternatives in this section.
Probit and Logit Models
The Probit and Logit models both can be used to predict the probability distribution
of an outcome variable based on the values of the independent variables. The two models
di¤er in the assumed distribution of the error term. The benet of these models is that
they automatically guarantee that the estimated probabilities of the outcome variable lie
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between zero and one. It may seem that the Probit and the Logit models are well suited for
my purpose. However, a key di¤erence is that in these two models, the dependent variable
is a discrete variable representing the outcome of an event. In contrast, in my case the
dependent variable itself is the probability distribution of the asset return. Therefore, the
Probit and the Logit models do not apply here. In additional, to obtain reasonable results
I impose two constraints on my estimates, requiring that each conditional probability lie
between zero and one and that they sum up to one given any particular value of the index
return. It is not trivial to incorporate these constraints into the Probit and Logit models.
In fact, it is not hard to see that once these constraints are met, the predicted marginal
probabilities of the asset return based on the current linear model are guaranteed to lie
between zero and one with no need for additional restrictions.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Another alternative econometric approach worth mentioning is the Maximum Likeli-
hood Estimation (MLE). Suppose that the joint distribution of the error terms t;t+1 =
(t;t+1 (1) ; t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; t;t+1 (K)) is given by the joint density function  () : If t;t+1 is
independent and identically distributed over time, then the conditional distribution matrix
 can be estimated by the following constrained MLE:
max
TY
t=1

 
qt;t+1   qIt;t+1  

;
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
0NK    1NK :
The key here is the joint density function  (). It is not clear what the best assumption
would be for the joint distribution of t;t+1. The normal distribution, for instance, may not
be a good choice. This is because both the true and the estimated marginal return distri-
butions of the asset (qt;t+1) have bounded values, and hence the associated measurement
errors t;t+1 should also be bounded, which is clearly not the case for normally distribution
variables. In addition, it is also likely that the di¤erent elements of t;t+1 are correlated
with each other, rendering the assumption on  () even more complicated.
21
While the constrained linear regression model adopted in this paper seems simple, I
will provide evidence for the out-of-sample validity of my estimation in the applications to
be discussed in the following sections.
6 Application I: Systematic Disaster Risk Premium
Starting from the seminal work of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), independently
developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a,b), and Mossin (1966), researchers have found
that the cross-sectional risk-return relation is driven by the comovement of individual asset
returns with the market return, which is usually termed systematic risk. Rubinstein
(1973) and Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) extend the CAPM framework, which focuses
on the second moment of security returns, to account for higher moments. More recently,
Kadan, Liu, and Liu (2014) propose a general framework of evaluating systematic risk for
a broad class of risk measures, potentially accounting for various risk attributes such as
high distribution moments, downside risk and rare disasters.
On the other hand, a large body of theoretical research shows that investors are averse
to rare disasters (e.g., Barro (2006, 2009), Gabaix (2008, 2012), Gourio (2012), Chen,
Joslin, and Tran (2012), and Wachter (2013)). Consistent with this, a number of empirical
papers have documented a positive relation between disaster risk and expected market
returns (e.g., Bali, Demirtas, and Levy (2009), Bollerslev and Todorov (2011), and Jiang
and Kelly (2013)).
Given that investors exhibit aversion to rare disasters and that they are concerned with
the comovement of asset returns with the market, it is then natural to conjecture that
investors require higher compensation for holding assets that are more sensitive to the
market disaster risk. This idea is empirically tested in the literature by Van Oordt and
Zhou (2012), Jiang and Kelly (2013), and Ruenzi and Weigert (2013). All three papers
show that stocks with higher sensitivity to the market disaster risk earn higher expected
returns, at least during some time period. Given the challenge of estimating disaster risk
due to the rare occurrence of disastrous events, all of these papers use historical returns
and model the tails by either the power law distribution or parametric copulas.
In this section, I propose a systematic disaster risk measure, which captures the
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sensitivity of asset returns to the market disaster risk. The measure is constructed based
on the conditional return distribution of an asset given the market return, which can be
readily estimated using my approach by taking the market portfolio as the related index.
My measure is estimated using option prices rather than historical security returns. Thus,
it is forward-looking and naturally accounts for investorsbeliefs on the likelihood of rare
events even if such events do not occur within sample. I empirically examine whether this
measure predicts the cross-section of expected stock returns.
6.1 Measure of Systematic Disaster Risk
I construct the systematic disaster risk measure of a stock based on its conditional return
distribution given the market return. For both the stocks and the market portfolio, I focus
on three-month returns, whose associated risk-neutral distributions can be extracted from
prices of options maturing in three months. The reason for using three-month returns is
because options with a maturity around three months are considered to have the most
accurate prices.
For both the market portfolio and the individual stocks, I dene two states (N = K =
2), the normal state (H) and the disaster state (L): I choose the disaster thresholds for the
three-month returns of the market and individual stocks to be -1/3 and -1/2, respectively.
In words, the market (a stock) experiences a disaster if it loses more than one third (one
half) of its original value within three months. The disaster threshold for individual stocks
is chosen to be lower than that for the market portfolio, because individual stock returns
are more volatile than the market return. I will later show that the choice of the disaster
thresholds is consistent with our notion of rare disasters.
For each stock, I dene the systematic disaster risk measure as
SysDis =  (LjL)   (LjH) ; (9)
where  (LjL) and  (LjH) stand for the disaster probabilities of the stock conditional on
the market being in the disaster and normal states, respectively. Intuitively, this measure
captures the extent to which an individual stock is more likely to experience a disaster
when the whole market moves from the normal state to the disaster state. In other words,
it is a measure of the sensitivity of individual stock returns to the market disaster risk.
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Since  (LjL) and  (LjH) are conditional probabilities and take values from 0 to 1,
it is apparent that the systematic disaster risk measure SysDis ranges from -1 to 1. In
particular, a positive value means that a stock is more likely to have a disaster when the
market as a whole is in the disaster state relative to when the market performs normally.
The higher the value of SysDis, the more sensitive the stock is to the market disaster risk.
On the other hand, a negative SysDis implies that the stock is less likely to experience
a disaster when the market falls into the disaster state, and therefore can be viewed as a
hedge against the market disaster risk.
6.2 Data
My sample period is from January 1996 to December 2012. I start from year 1996 because
option pricing information is not available before then. I use the S&P500 index as a proxy
for the market portfolio. This index has actively traded call and put options that cover
a wide range of moneyness and time to maturity levels. I focus on all rms traded on
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ with option prices available. My primary source of data is
the OptionMetrics database, which contains multiple data sets and provides me with the
following information for both the S&P500 index and the individual stocks.
 The option prices data set contains daily records of the implied volatility and option
vega for all available options with a variety of strike prices and expiration dates. I
use this information to t the implied volatility surface by kernel smoothing. (See
Appendix B for details.)
 The security prices data set has daily security prices and returns.
 The index dividend yield data set provides me with annualized dividend yield for the
S&P500 index.
 The dividend distribution history data set has the dates and amounts of dividend
payments for individual stocks. On each date t, I estimate the dividend yield for
each stock over the three-month period ahead as the ratio of the total dividend
payments during the period to the stock price on date t.
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 The zero coupon yield curve data set contains continuously compounded zero-coupon
interest rates for various numbers of days to maturity. The zero-coupon rate is used
as a proxy for the risk-free rate in the calculation of the BMS option prices. Since I
focus on prices of options with a maturity of three months, I need the three-month
interest rate. When the interest rate with this maturity level is not directly given in
the data set, I estimate it by linear approximation using rates for adjacent numbers
of days to maturity available.
In addition to the above information from OptionMetrics, I also collect the following
data. First, I obtain monthly returns for all stocks during the sample period from the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. These monthly returns are used
as the dependent variable in the cross-sectional test. In addition, to control for the CAPM
beta in my test, I obtain daily excess returns of the CRSP value-weighted market portfolio
from the Kenneth French online data library, which are useful for the estimation of beta.
Finally, to control for the valuee¤ect documented in Fama and French (1993), I include
the book-to-market ratio as a risk factor in the test. For this sake, I obtain the book value
of equity for all stocks from the Compustat database.
6.3 Empirical Strategy
My hypothesis states that stocks with higher systematic disaster risk earn higher expected
returns. In addition, I conjecture that this relation should be more pronounced when the
market disaster risk becomes higher, i.e., when a market crash is considered to be more
likely to happen. The intuition is as follows. Suppose that the market performs well and
that the probability of a market crash is very low. Then, even if a stock could be sensitive
to the market disaster risk, investors may not be much concerned given that a market
disaster is very unlikely to happen. On the other hand, when investors believe that the
probability of a market crash is considerably high, they may have strong incentives to avoid
investing in stocks with high systematic disaster risk. This is because it now becomes very
likely that investments in these stocks could incur large losses upon the occurrence of a
market crash.
To test these hypotheses, I follow the standard approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973)
and Fama and French (1992). For each month within the sample period, I perform a cross-
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sectional regression of monthly excess stock returns on the lagged values of various stock
characteristics. I then test the risk premium associated with a certain characteristic by
conducting a t-test on the corresponding coe¢ cient estimates across all months. To see how
the systematic disaster risk premium depends on the market condition, I dene a market
disaster risk variable DisM ; estimated annually as the average option-implied risk-neutral
disaster probability of the market portfolio across all dates of the year. Apparently, a high
value of DisM indicates that investorsperceived likelihood of a market crash is high. I
then repeat the test using subsamples constructed based on the lagged value of DisM ; and
see how the relation between systematic disaster risk and expected stock returns changes
across di¤erent subsamples.
The main stock characteristic of interest is the systematic disaster risk SysDis dened
in Section 6.1. I estimate this variable for each stock on an annual basis in three steps.
First, on each date, I compute the option-implied risk-neutral probabilities of disaster
for both the S&P500 index and each individual stock. For stocks with a low level of
option trading around the disaster threshold, the limited availability of option prices can
potentially a¤ect the accuracy of estimation. To enhance accuracy, I compute the risk-
neutral disaster probability for a stock on a date only when (1) there are at least ten
di¤erent options written on the stock with pricing information available on that date, (2)
the lowest moneyness level (ratio of strike price to stock price) of available options for the
stock on that date is no higher than 0.95, and (3) the shortest (longest) time to maturity
of available options for the stock on that date is lower (higher) than three months. In
the second step, I run the constrained linear regression (8) for each stock-year using all
dates within the year to obtain the conditional disaster probabilities of the stock given
di¤erent states of the market. To improve accuracy, I perform this step only for stocks
with risk-neutral disaster probability available for no less than 200 days during the year.
Finally, I compute SysDis using the denition (9).
To disentangle the e¤ect of the systematic disaster risk on the expected stock return
from that of the unconditionalpropensity of a stock to experience a disastrous event, I
control for each stocks unconditional disaster risk (Dis) in the cross-sectional regressions.
The Dis variable is estimated annually for each stock as the average option-implied risk-
neutral disaster probability of the stock across all dates during the entire year.
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To further control for other risk factors, I include the following stock characteristic
variables in the test:
 CAPM beta (Beta), estimated annually using daily equity returns. Following Amihud
(2002), I estimate beta by size portfolios. At the end of each year, I rank all stocks into
ten size portfolios based on NYSE breakpoints.3 For each size portfolio, I compute
the portfolio return as the equal-weighted average return of all stocks in the portfolio,
based on which I then estimate the portfolio beta. Finally, I assign the portfolio beta
to all stocks in the portfolio.
 Coskewness (Coskew); estimated annually using daily equity returns. Following Har-
vey and Siddique (2000), I measure coskewness as the covariance of stock excess
returns and the square of market excess returns.
 Firm size (Size), estimated monthly as the logarithm of the total market capitaliza-
tion.
 Book-to-market ratio (B2M); estimated annually as the ratio of the end-of-year book
value of equity to the end-of-year market capitalization.
 Lagged stock return, proxied by the stock return (Ret) of the previous month. This
is to capture the momentum e¤ect documented in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
 Mean-adjusted illiquidity (IlliqMA); estimated annually for each stock according to
Amihud (2002) as the annual average of the ratio of absolute daily return to daily
dollar volume of trading, adjusted by the cross-sectional mean.
Notice that the variables SysDis; Dis; Beta; Coskew; B2M; and IlliqMA are all
estimated on an annual basis. Therefore, in the cross-sectional regressions, I always regress
excess stock returns in a particular month on the values of these variables estimated from
the previous year. On the other hand, since Size and Ret are available monthly, I use the
one-month lagged values of these two variables in the cross-sectional regressions to capture
the size and momentum e¤ects.
3As pointed out in Fama and French (1992), the idea of using NYSE breakpoints is to avoid having most
size portfolios dominated by small stocks traded on NASDAQ.
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6.4 Results
To make sure that my estimation of SysDis generates reasonable results, I rst check the
out-of-sample validity by trying to predict future states of stocks using my conditional
disaster probability estimation. In particular, for each year I take the rst quarter and
try to predict the state of a stock over the quarter based on the realized state of the
market during the same quarter and the conditional disaster probabilities estimated from
the previous year. Year 2008 is a special year in my sample, because towards the end of the
year the market indeed experienced a rare disaster with the three-month S&P500 return
lower than -1/3. This turns out to be the only occurrence of a market crash throughout the
entire sample period according to my denition in Section 6.1. Hence, for this year instead
of focusing on the rst quarter, I try to predict the state of each stock over the 91-day
period from August 22, 2008 to November 20, 2008, during which the S&P500 return was
-41%.
For each quarter-length period mentioned above, I determine the states of each in-
dividual stock and the S&P500 index (H or L) over the period based on their returns
using the denition of Section 6.1. Then, for each stock and each quarter-length pe-
riod, I compare two quantities: 1stock in state L, a dummy variable that takes on a value
of 1 if the stock delivers a disastrous return of over the period and 0 otherwise, and
^ (Ljrealized state of S&P500), the conditional disaster probability of the stock estimated
from the previous year given the realized state of S&P500 over the period. I rst check the
correlation between these two quantities and nd that they exhibit a strong positive corre-
lation of 0.52. This indicates that the higher the predicted conditional disaster probability,
the higher the actual occurrence of a rm disaster.
I then compute the following di¤erence
 = 1stock in state L   ^ (Ljrealized state of S&P500) :
Since 1stock in state L is a dummy variable for whether a rm disaster occurs and ^ (Ljrealized state of S&P500)
represents the conditional disaster probability, their di¤erence  for any one occasion does
not contain much information. However, when I take the average across di¤erent stocks
and periods, according the the law of large numbers these two quantities should be close
to each other if my estimations are meaningful. Motivated by this idea, I compute the
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average of  for normal and disaster states of the market separately. Conditional on a
realized disaster market state (August 22, 2008 to November 20, 2008) and a realized nor-
mal market state (all other quarter-length periods), the average values of  are -0.01 and
0.13, respectively. These numbers are reasonably small in magnitude, providing evidence
for good out-of-sample validity.
Next I compute summary statistics for the disaster risk variables DisM ; Dis and
SysDis. The results are reported in Table 1. The mean value of the market disaster
risk DisM across the sample period is around 0.013, implying that on average a market
crash is believed to occur with a risk-neutral probability of 0.013. In addition, the stan-
dard deviation, median, minimum, and maximum of DisM are estimated as 0.010, 0.012,
0.002, and 0.033, respectively. For the unconditional disaster risk (Dis) and the systematic
disaster risk (SysDis) of individual stocks, I compute the mean and standard deviation
across all stocks for each single year, and I report summary statistics of these annual cross-
sectional means and standard deviations in the table. In particular, the mean value of the
annual cross-sectional mean of Dis is equal to 0.031, indicating that on average individual
stocks are believed to experience a disastrous event with a risk-neutral probability of 0.031.
The mean value of the annual cross-sectional mean of SysDis is around 0.335, suggesting
that the conditional disaster probability of an individual stock given a market disaster is
on average higher by 0.335 than its conditional disaster probability given normal market
conditions.
Table 2 reports the correlation coe¢ cients of SysDis with other stock characteristics.4
The results show that SysDis has a strong positive correlation of 0.40 with the uncon-
ditional disaster risk (Dis), meaning that stocks with a higher sensitivity to the market
disaster risk are also prone to rare disasters by themselves. In addition, SysDis also has
a positive correlation of 0.14 with the CAPM beta (Beta), indicating that stocks with a
higher sensitivity to the market disaster risk are also more sensitive to the overall market
movement. Further, SysDis has a small positive correlation with the book-to-market ratio
(B2M); and is negatively correlated with coskewness (Coskew) and illiquidity (IlliqMA).
I next perform the Fama-MacBeth test on the cross-sectional risk premium associated
4Since SysDis is estimated annually, I examine its correlation with other annually estimated stock
characteristics only.
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with SysDis. The test period extends from January 1997 to December 2012, which covers
16 years (192 months). In each month, the number of stocks included in the cross-sectional
regression varies from 553 to 2270. The test results for the entire sample period are reported
in Table 3. I rst conduct the test with SysDis as the only regressor (column 1). The result
shows that SysDis has a positive coe¢ cient, but it is statistically insignicant. In fact, it
remain insignicant after controlling for other stock characteristics (column 2). Consistent
with existing evidence, beta has no signicant e¤ect on expected stock returns, and its
coe¢ cient is even negative. Further, Coskew has a negative coe¢ cient, as expected, but
it is also statistically insignicant. Perhaps due to the relatively short sample period and
the fact that I focus on the set of stocks with option trading only, some well-documented
risk factors including size, book-to-market, and illiquidity do not show a signicant e¤ect,
either. The one-month lagged return, on the other hand, has a signicantly negative e¤ect
on future expected stock returns, implying a reversal in the return process.
I then examine how the relation between systematic disaster risk and expected stock
returns changes with the market disaster risk. For this purpose, I rank all months in the
sample by the market disaster risk (DisM ) of the previous year and divide the entire sample
into four subsamples, each containing 48 months. I repeat the test for each of the four
subsamples separately. The results show that for the rst three subsamples for which the
lagged market disaster risk is below the rst quartile (Columns 1 and 2), between the rst
and the second quartiles (Columns 3 and 4), and between the second and the third quartiles
(Columns 5 and 6), SysDis does not carry a positive premium. In fact, when the lagged
market disaster risk is between the rst and the second quartiles (Columns 3 and 4), SysDis
even has a negative coe¢ cient signicant at the 10% level after controlling for other risk
factors. However, if I restrict the test to months for which the previous year market disaster
risk is higher than the third quartile (columns 7 and 8), SysDis becomes signicant at
the 1% level, and this e¤ect remains after including other risk factors. Indeed, in this case
increasing SysDis by one standard deviation raises the expected monthly stock return by
63 basis points, which is equivalent to an increase of over 7% per year. Interestingly, when
restricted to this subsample, the unconditional disaster risk (Dis) also carries a signicantly
positive premium. This implies that investors also require compensation for holding stocks
with high unconditional disaster risk when a market crash is considered likely.
30
To sum up, the empirical study in this section shows no clear evidence that systematic
disaster risk is priced by investors under normal market conditions. However, it has a
strongly positive e¤ect on expected future stock returns when the market-wide disaster
risk is considerably high.
7 Application II: Bank Systemic Exposure
This section applies my approach to study the systemic risk of the banking sector. Systemic
risk is the risk of collapse of the entire banking system due to the interrelation and inter-
dependence of all banks. The study of systemic risk has recently attracted much attention,
especially following the nancial crisis of 20072009. Two aspects of systemic risk are of
particular interest to researchers, one looking at the contribution of individual banks to
the risk of the whole banking system, and the other focusing on the exposure of individual
banks to systemic shocks.
Despite the general interests in learning about systemic risk, the empirical estimation is
challenging due to the small probability of disastrous events. Di¤erent methods have been
proposed in the literature to tackle this problem. For example, Huang, Zhou, and Zhu
(2009) measure systemic risk by the price of insurance against nancial distress, in which
the default correlation between banks is proxied by the equity return correlation. Acharya,
Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson (2010) propose the systemic expected shortfall (SES)
measure, which estimates the propensity of a bank to be undercapitalized when the system
as a whole is undercapitalized. Their approach relies on the power law distribution to model
the tails. In addition, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) dene the CoV aR measure as
the di¤erence between the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional on an individual
bank being in distress and the value-at-risk of the banking system conditional on the bank
being solvent. The empirical estimation of CoV aR uses quantile regression to capture
the tails. One commonality of these papers is that they all measure systemic risk based on
historical equity returns.
In this section, I examine the exposure of banks to systemic shocks and ask what bank
characteristics are related to bankssystemic exposure. To this end, I propose a systemic
exposuremeasure based on the conditional return distribution of a bank given the return
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of the banking sector portfolio, which can be estimated using my approach by taking the
sector portfolio as the related index. Since the measure is empirically estimated using
option prices as opposed to historical equity returns, it is forward-looking and naturally
accounts for investorsbeliefs on the likelihood of disastrous events even if such events do
not occur within sample.
7.1 Measure of Systemic Exposure
The systemic exposure measure resembles the systematic disaster risk measure introduced
in Section 6.1. The main di¤erence is that I now focus on the joint performance of a bank
and the whole banking system, and hence I use the banking sector portfolio (as opposed
to the market portfolio) as the related index.
As before, I look at equity returns over periods of three months. For both the banking
sector and individual banks, I dene two states (N = K = 2), the normal state (H) and the
disaster state (L): I choose the disaster thresholds for the three-month returns of both the
sector portfolio and individual banks to be -1/2. Intuitively, the sector (a bank) experiences
a disastrous event if it loses more than one half of its original value within three months.
Then, for each bank I dene the systemic exposure measure as
SysExp =  (LjL)   (LjH) ; (10)
where  (LjL) and  (LjH) stand for the disaster probability of the bank conditional on
the sector being in the disaster and the normal states, respectively. This measure captures
the extent to which a bank is more likely to experience a disaster when the whole sector
falls from the normal state to the disaster state. Put di¤erently, it is a measure of the
sensitivity of individual bank returns to the sector-wide disaster risk.
The systemic exposure measure takes values from -1 to 1. A positive value means that
a bank is more likely to experience a disaster when the sector as a whole is in the disaster
state relative to when the sector performs normally. The higher the value of SysExp, the
more sensitive the bank is to sector-wide disaster risk. On the other hand, a negative value
of SysExp implies that the bank becomes safer when the sector is hit by a disastrous event.
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7.2 Data and Estimation
I use the KBW Bank Index as a proxy for the banking sector portfolio, which consists of 24
banking companies and has options actively traded on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. I
focus on computing the systemic exposure measure for each of the 24 current constituent
banks of the index.5 The current composition of the index is shown in Table 4.
My sample period is from January 1996 to December 2012. For both the KBW Bank
Index and the 24 banks, I collect daily information on option prices, security prices and
dividend distributions from the OptionMetrics database. Notice that some of the 24 banks
were formed by mergers and acquisitions at some points during my sample, and some others
temporarily stopped trading on the option market for some periods. As a result, not all of
the 24 banks have full records throughout the entire sample period.
I estimate SysExp in three steps. First, on each date I compute the option-implied
risk-neutral probability of disaster for both the KBW Index and the individual banks.
To maintain the accuracy of estimation, I compute the risk-neutral disaster probability
for a bank on a date only when (1) there are at least ten di¤erent options with pricing
information available for the bank on that date, (2) the lowest moneyness level of available
options for the bank on that date is no higher than 0.95, and (3) the shortest (longest)
time to maturity of available options for the bank on that date is lower (higher) than
three months. The average risk-neutral disaster probabilities for the KBW Bank Index
and for the individual banks throughout the sample period are estimated as 0.010 and
0.018, respectively. In the second step, I run the constrained linear regression (8) for each
bank over time to obtain the conditional disaster probabilities of the bank given di¤erent
states of the sector. Finally, I compute SysExp using the denition (10).
I am also interested in what bank characteristics predict banks systemic exposure.
To examine this issue, I construct the following bank characteristics. The rst three are
computed using daily security pricing information taken from the OptionMetrics database,
whereas the rest are constructed from quarterly bank fundamentals obtained from the
Compustat database.
5While I focus on the 24 current constituent banks of the KBW index in this application, there is nothing
preventing me from estimating SysExp for other banks. The 24 banks are among the largest banks in the
sector and are considered to have the most inuences upon the economy. Hence, results based on these
banks are of particular economic import.
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 Market beta (Beta), estimated with respect to the market portfolio using daily equity
returns over the most recent 90 business days. The market excess returns and the
risk-free rates needed for the estimation are taken from the Kenneth French online
data library.
 Sector beta (BetaS), estimated with respect to the banking sector portfolio using
daily equity returns over the most recent 90 business days. The banking sector
portfolio is proxied by the KBW Bank Index.
 Equity return volatility (V ol), estimated over the most recent 90 business days as
the standard deviation of the daily equity returns.
 Bank size (Size), computed as the logarithm of the total market capitalization.
 Leverage (Lever), estimated as the ratio of the total book value of assets to the total
book value of equity.
 Market-to-book ratio (M2B), computed as the ratio of the total market capitalization
to the total book value of equity.
 Non-interest to interest income ratio (N2I), estimated as the ratio of total non-
interest income to the total interest income. The inclusion of this variable is motivated
by Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia (2012), who show that the N2I ratio contributes
to bankssystemic risk.
 Maturity mismatch. I construct two proxies for maturity mismatch. First is the
ratio of total demand deposits to the total book value of assets (MatMis1), and the
second is the ratio of total interest-bearing deposits to the total book value of assets
(MatMis2). Since interest-bearing deposits generally have longer maturities and are
less often withdrawn than demand deposits, the extent of maturity mismatch of a
bank is positively related to the rst proxy and negatively related to the second.
7.3 Results
I rst estimate the systemic exposure of each bank using the entire sample period. That is,
I run the constrained linear regression (8) based on the risk-neutral disaster probabilities of
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both the KBW Index and the bank of interest throughout the whole sample. Notice that
due to missing option prices for some banks during some periods of the sample, the e¤ective
estimation period may di¤er from bank to bank. Table 5 reports the estimation results.
A rst observation is that the systemic exposure is positive for all banks, indicating that
banks are generally more likely to experience a disastrous event when the banking sector
as a whole is hit by a disaster relative to when the sector operates in the normal state. For
example, the systemic exposure of JPMorgan Chase & Co. is 0.686, meaning that when the
banking sector moves from the normal state to the disaster state, the conditional disaster
probability of the bank increases by 0.686. In addition, it can be seen that the systemic
exposure varies much across di¤erent banks, from a minimum of 0.116 for Commerce
Bancshares Inc. to a maximum of 0.993 for Comerica Inc.
I next ask the question of what bank characteristics predict systemic exposure. To
address this question, I estimate SysExp for each bank at the end of each month based
on option prices of the most recent 90 business days. To improve accuracy, I perform
estimation only if the risk-neutral disaster probability is available for the bank for at least
60 days in the 90-business-day window. This yields a panel for the SysExp measure across
di¤erent banks over time.
To make sure that my estimation of SysExp generates reasonable results, I check the
out-of-sample validity by trying to predict future states of banks using my conditional
disaster probability estimation. As in the previous application, I take the rst quarter of
each year and try to predict the state of a bank over the quarter based on the realized state
of the sector during the same quarter and the conditional disaster probabilities estimated
from the most recent 90-business-day window. From late 2008 to early 2009, the banking
sector was hit by a disastrous shock, during which the three-month KBW return dropped
below -1/2. This turns out to be the only occurrence of a sector-wide disaster throughout
the entire sample period according to my denition in Section 7.1. Hence, instead of looking
at the rst quarter of 2009, I try to predict the state of each bank over the 91-day period
from November 5, 2008 to February 3, 2009, during which the return of the KBW Index
was -56%.
For each quarter-length period mentioned above, I determine the states of each bank
and the KBW Index (H or L) over the period based on their returns using the denition of
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Section 7.1. Then, for each bank and each quarter-length period, I compare two quantities:
1bank in state L, a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if the bank delivers a disastrous
return of over the period and 0 otherwise, and ^ (Ljrealized state of KBW), the conditional
disaster probability of the bank estimated from the most recent 90-business-day window
given the realized state of KBW over the period. I rst check the correlation between
these two quantities and nd that they exhibit a strong positive correlation of 0.75. This
indicates that the higher the predicted conditional disaster probability, the higher the
actual occurrence of a bank disaster.
I then compute the following di¤erence
 = 1bank in state L   ^ (Ljrealized state of KBW) ;
and take the average of  across all banks and across di¤erent periods. My results show
that conditional on a realized disaster state of KBW (November 5, 2008 to February 3,
2009) and a realized normal state of KBW (all other quarter-length periods), the average
values of  are -0.01 and 0.0006, respectively. This serves as evidence for good out-of-
sample validity of my estimation.
I then regress SysExp on lagged values of the bank characteristics discussed in Section
7.2. Since some characteristics have low frequency (quarterly available), I take as regressors
the most recent value of each bank characteristic computed prior to the 90-business-day
window used to estimate SysExp: Table 6 reports the regression results. I rst run the
regression without any xed e¤ects (column 1). The results show that the total return
volatility, the market-to-book ratio, and the bank size have positive and statistically signif-
icant coe¢ cients. On the other hand, the market beta, the leverage ratio, the non-interest
to interest income ratio, and the maturity mismatch proxies do not seem to be related to
bankssystemic exposure.
I then rerun the regression controlling for the bank-xed e¤ects (column 2). The return
volatility and the market-to-book ratio remain positive and signicant. However, the size
variable loses its signicance, and now it even switches to a negative sign. This implies
that the positive correlation between size and systemic exposure is completely absorbed
by the bank-xed e¤ects. In addition, the non-interest to interest income ratio becomes
signicant at the 10% level. Its positive coe¢ cient indicates that the systemic exposure of
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a bank increases with its noncore activities (e.g., investment banking, venture capital, and
trading activities) relative to the traditional banking businesses.
Next, I perform the regression with both bank- and year-xed e¤ects. The market beta
now has a signicantly positive coe¢ cient, indicating that a banks sensitivity to the overall
market movement positively predicts its systemic exposure. The return volatility continues
to have a positive and signicant coe¢ cient, reinforcing the result that systemic exposure
is increasing in the total return volatility. The market-to-book ratio loses its signicance
after controlling for the year-xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient of the size variable remains
negative, and it now becomes signicant at the 10% level, suggesting weak evidence for
decreasing systemic exposure with size. Interestingly, the non-interest to interest income
ratio continues to have a positive and even more signicant e¤ect on systemic exposure.
This conrms the result that a banks exposure to systemic shocks is driven by its non-
traditional businesses. Finally, notice that after controlling for the bank- and year-xed
e¤ects, the R-squared almost doubles, from 0.109 to 0.214, meaning that a large portion of
the variation in the systemic exposure can be explained by bank- and year-specic factors.
Finally, I replace the market beta by the sector beta, controlling for all other bank
characteristics and xed e¤ects. The sector beta has a positive coe¢ cient and is signicant
at the 1% level, implying that banks that are more sensitive to the overall sector movement
also tend to be more sensitive to the sector disaster risk. Results concerning other charac-
teristics remain mostly unchanged, but the size variable now becomes insignicant with a
t-statistic of -1.45. Overall, the results suggest that the systemic exposure cannot be fully
predicted by the linear relation between individual bank returns and the sector returns (as
captured by the sector beta) alone. Other bank characteristics such as the total return
volatility and the non-interest to interest income ratio are also important predictors.
To sum up, I nd that a bank exhibits higher exposure to systemic shocks when it is
more sensitive to the overall market and sector movement, when its equity return becomes
more volatile, and when it puts a larger weight on non-traditional businesses. I also nd
weak evidence that bank size negatively predicts the exposure to systemic shocks. In
addition, bankssystemic exposure is also considerably driven by bank- and time-specic
e¤ects.
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8 Application III: Ross Recovery for Individual Assets
The distributions of security returns generally di¤er under the physical versus the risk-
neutral measures to reect the adjustment for risk aversion. Ross (1976) and Breeden
and Litzenberger (1978) show that option prices reveal information on the risk-neutral
distributions of security returns (see Section 4.1). Unfortunately, it is a priori not clear
how the physical return distributions can be estimated. Ross (2014) proposes a novel
idea called the recovery theorem that enables us to separate physical return distributions
from risk adjustments based on the risk-neutral distributions alone. Subsequent research
further explores extensions and alternative approaches to tackle this problem (e.g., Carr
and Yu (2012), Huang and Shaliastovich (2013), Martin and Ross (2013), Walden (2013),
Dubynskiy and Goldstein (2013), and Boroviµcka, Hansen and Scheinkman (2014)). All
of these papers primarily focus on the market portfolio, and the recovery results do not
directly apply to individual assets.
In this section, I extend the recovery results from the market portfolio to individual
assets. I show that this can be accomplished through the risk-neutral joint distribution of
the asset return with the market return, which can be conveniently estimated using my
approach by taking the market portfolio as the related index. While I base my discussion
on the original Ross (2014) recovery theorem, it is worth noticing that my extension is
not restricted to Rosss original result but rather can be applied to any recovery result
developed for the market portfolio. I start by reviewing the Ross recovery theorem.
8.1 Ross Recovery Theorem
Consider a one-period economy with two time points 1 and 2. Suppose that there is an
aggregate market portfolio whose value denes N states indexed by f1; 2; :::; Ng.6 For any
n1; n2 2 f1; 2; :::; Ng ; let  (n1; n2) denote the physical transition probability of moving
from state n1 at time 1 to state n2 at time 2. In addition, let  (n1; n2) denote the price at
time 1 of an asset that pays one dollar at time 2 if the market is in state n1 at time 1 and
in state n2 at time 2. Notice that  (n1; n2) is typically referred to as the state price, and
it is equal to the risk-neutral transition probability from state n1 to state n2 discounted at
6 In Rosss model, it is the value of the market portfolio, instead of the return, that determines the state
of nature.
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the risk-free rate. The recovery theorem works directly with the state prices rather than
the corresponding risk-neutral probabilities.
The Ross recovery theorem is motivated by the following model. Assume that a rep-
resentative agent exists, who has an additively time-separable von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility function U () with U 0 () > 0 and U 00 () < 0: Also assume that the representative
agent has initial wealth W and a subjective time discount factor  2 (0; 1). The agent
chooses the optimal consumptions at time 1 and 2 subject to the budget constraint. As-
sume that the optimal consumption level depends on the state of the market only, and is in
particular time independent. Denote the optimal consumption in state n by c (n). Then,
at time 1 the agent solves the following utility optimization problem:
max
fc(1); ;c(N)g
U (c (n1)) + 
NX
n2=1
U (c (n2)) (n1; n2)
s:t:
c (n1) +
NX
n2=1
c (n2) (n1; n2) = W:
The solution to the above optimization problem is given by the rst order condition
U 0 (c (n1)) (n1; n2) = U 0 (c (n2)) (n1; n2) :
Rewriting the rst order condition in matrix form, we obtain
D  =  D;
where
D =
0BBB@
U 0 (c (1)) 0 : : : 0
0 U 0 (c (2)) : : : 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 : : : U 0 (c (N))
1CCCA ;
 =
0B@  (1; 1) : : :  (1; N)... . . . ...
 (N; 1) : : :  (N;N)
1CA ;
and
 =
0B@  (1; 1) : : :  (1; N)... . . . ...
 (N; 1) : : :  (N;N)
1CA :
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Since U 0 () > 0; the matrix D is invertible. Then, solving for  yields
 =
1

D  D 1: (11)
Since  is a transition probability matrix, we must have that starting from any state,
the transition probabilities to all states sum up to 1, i.e.,
  1N1 = 1N1:
This condition and (11) together imply
  1N1 = 1

D  D 1  1N1 = 1N1;
which can be rewritten as
   =   ;
where  = D 1  1N1: In particular, U 0 () > 0 implies   0; where  means strictly
greater thanin each and every element. That is,  is a strictly positive eigenvector of 
with a corresponding positive eigenvalue :
The Perron-Frobenius theorem (see Meyer (2000)) shows that all nonnegative irre-
ducible matrices have a unique positive eigenvalue associated with a unique positive eigen-
vector up to scaling. If we assume no arbitrage, then the matrix of state prices  is
non-negative, with zero elements if and only if the corresponding physical probabilities are
zero. If  is also irreducible, one can uniquely identify the subjective discount factor 
and the vector  (or equivalently the diagonal matrix D) up to scaling. Finally, plugging 
and D into (11) allows one to recover the physical transition matrix : Notice that while
the matrix D has an undetermined scaling parameter, the same parameter in D and D 1
exactly cancels out, rendering the physical transition matrix  uniquely identied.
To apply the recovery theorem empirically, an essential step is to estimate the state
price matrix  from data. As discussed in Section 4.1, we can extract the risk-neutral
probabilities and equivalently the corresponding state prices from option prices. One main
challenge, however, is that this method only allows us to obtain the state prices starting
from the realized initial state at time 1. Without loss of generality, assume that the realized
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state of the market is n1 = 1 at time 1. Then, one can estimate from option prices  (1; n2)
for all n2 (the rst row of ) but not  (n1; n2) for n1 6= 1:
To resolve this problem, Ross (2014) comes up with a brilliant idea. Let
l =

l (1; 1) ; l (1; 2) ; : : : ; l (1; N)

denote the vector of the l-period state prices starting from state 1. Specically, l (1; n)
equals the price of an asset that pays one dollar in l periods if the market is in state 1 today
and in state n after l periods. Notice that 1 coincides with ( (1; 1) ;  (1; 2) ; : : : ;  (1; N))
from the above one-period setting. Further assume that the state of the market portfolio
follows a Markov process. Then for any l = 1; 2; :::; N   1; we have the following recursive
forward equations
l+1 = l : (12)
This forms a linear system of the state price matrix ; where the ls can be estimated
from option prices with di¤erent maturities. Then, solving this linear system yields ;
which can then be used to recover the physical transition matrix :
The recovery theorem deals with the entire transition matrix, which in particular in-
cludes transition probabilities starting from the realized initial state as well as from all other
hypothetical initial states. Often times, however, we are mostly interested in the transition
probabilities starting from the realized initial state ( (1; 1) ;  (1; 2) ; : : : ;  (1; N)) : Having
the initial state xed, we then have a 11 mapping between the market return and the
future market value (given by (6)). Using the notations of my framework in Section 3
and focusing on transition probabilities starting from the realized initial state, (11) can be
readily rewritten as
pIt;t+1 (n) =
1

e rf qIt;t+1 (n)
U 0 (c (1))
U 0 (c (n))
; (13)
where index I is chosen as the market portfolio, pIt;t+1 (n) is the physical probability of
moving from the current market state to state n in one period, e rf qIt;t+1 (n) is the state
price, and  as well as U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) are uniquely determined from the Ross recovery result.
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8.2 Extension to Individual Assets
To see how the recovery result can be applied to individual assets, it is useful to consider
(13) for the market portfolio. This formula shows that the physical distribution of the
market return can be decomposed into three parts. The rst part is the reciprocal of the
subjective discount factor 1 , which is a constant and in particular does not depend on
the future market state. The second component is the state price e rf qIt;t+1 (n), which
can be estimated from option prices. Finally, the third part is the pricing kernel U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) ;
representing the adjustment for risk aversion in di¤erent states of the market.
One cannot directly apply (13) to recover the physical return distribution of an indi-
vidual asset from the associated risk-neutral distribution. The reason is that the same
value of the asset return can appear in di¤erent states of the market unless there is perfect
correlation between the asset return and the market return. Given that the pricing ker-
nel U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) is a function of the market return (xing the initial market value), there is in
general no single U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) that can be used for any particular value of the asset return.
Fortunately, this problem can be resolved through the risk-neutral joint return distrib-
ution of the asset with the market. In particular, one can express the risk-neutral marginal
distribution of the asset return as the sum of its risk-neutral joint probabilities with the
market return, i.e.,
qt;t+1 (k) =
NX
n=1
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

; 8k:
Then, each of the risk-neutral joint probabilities q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

can be
adjusted for risk aversion by the appropriate value of U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) ; which allows one to recover
the physical joint probabilities. Finally, summing up the physical joint probabilities across
all states of the market yields the physical marginal return distribution of the asset. This
is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 At any time t, the physical distribution of the asset return over one period
head can be recovered as
pt;t+1 (k) =
1

e rf
NX
n=1
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+ = r
I (n)
 U 0 (c (1))
U 0 (c (n))
; 8k; (14)
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where  and U
0(c(1))
U 0(c(n)) are uniquely determined from the Ross recovery theorem.
It is clear from Proposition 3 that the key to recovering the physical return distribution
of an individual asset is the risk-neutral joint return distribution of this asset with the mar-
ket portfolio. We know from the probability theory that this risk-neutral joint distribution
equals the product of the risk-neutral marginal return distribution of the market and the
conditional return distribution of the asset given the market return, i.e.,
q
 
~rIt;t+1 = r
I (n) ; ~rt;t+1 = r (k)

= qIt;t+1 (n)  (kjn) ; 8n; k: (15)
While the former can be obtained from option prices, my approach allows me to estimate
the latter by taking the market portfolio as the related index. Hence, my framework lends
itself naturally to the extension of the Ross recovery theorem to individual assets.
9 Conclusion
In this paper I propose a novel approach to recovering the conditional return distribution
of an individual asset given the return of an aggregate index by regressing the marginal
return distribution of the asset on that of the index. The identifying assumption that
underlies this approach states that the conditional return distribution of the asset given
any value of the index return does not vary over time. Intuitively, this means that the time
variation in the return distribution of the asset is solely driven by the time variation in the
return distribution of the index. This assumption allows me to make use of the time series
information on the marginal return distributions of both securities to pin-down the time-
invariant conditional distribution of the asset return given the index return. Empirically, I
show how this approach can be implemented using option prices. I also discuss a variety of
applications of this approach to the cross-sectional test of equity risk premium associated
with systematic disaster risk, to the estimation of banksexposure to systemic shocks, and
to the extension the Ross (2014) recovery theorem to individual assets.
The advantage of my approach is that it generates the entire conditional return distrib-
ution of the asset given the index return, thus accounting for high moment properties and
potential nonlinear patterns of the joint behavior of the two securities. In addition, since
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the estimation relies on option prices rather than historical equity returns, it is forward-
looking and reects the e¤ects of rare events even if they do not truly occur within sample.
Further, compared to the copula approach, which is widely used to back out the joint dis-
tribution of multiple random variables from the associated marginals, my approach does
not rely on any parametric assumptions on the security returns, thus allowing for greater
exibility. Yet, unlike some non-parametric procedures which are computationally very
expensive, my approach can be easily implemented by a constrained linear regression.
Future work can be conducted in di¤erent directions. On the methodology side, re-
search needs to be done on extending the framework to estimate the joint behavior of
potentially more than two arbitrary economic variables (besides the returns of an asset
and an aggregate index). In terms of applications, this approach can be used to address
other important questions related to risk management and rm cyclicality, etc.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: At time t; the risk-neutral conditional probability of ~rt;t+1 =
r (k) given ~rIt;t+1 = r
I (n) is
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) j~rIt;t+1 = rI (n)

=
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

qIt;t+1 (n)
: (16)
By Assumption 2, the variation in the index return is the only priced risk. Thus, there
exists a stochastic discount factor, whose value related to future payo¤s depends on the
future value of the index return only. Let
 
t;t+1 (1) ; t;t+1 (2) ; : : : ; t;t+1 (N)

denote the
stochastic discount factor evaluated at time t related to payo¤s to be received in di¤erent
states of the index return at time t+1: This allows one to convert risk-neutral probabilities
to physical probabilities. In particular, we have
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

= erf t;t+1 (n) p
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

; (17)
and
qIt;t+1 (n) = e
rf t;t+1 (n) p
I
t;t+1 (n) : (18)
Plugging (17) and (18) into (16) yields
q
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) j~rIt;t+1 = rI (n)

=
p
 
~rt;t+1 = r (k) ; ~r
I
t;t+1 = r
I (n)

pIt;t+1 (n)
=  (kjn) ;
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as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 2: This proof relies on Theorem 2 of Liew (1976), which speaks
about the estimates from a inequality-constrained least squares regression. The theorem
says that when the inequality constraints are not binding with respect to the true parameter
values, the estimates from the original inequality-constrained regression are equal to the
estimates from the same regression without the inequality constraints when the sample size
becomes large enough.
To prove the consistency of ^T ; I consider two possible cases.
Case 1 : Suppose that 0 <  (kjn) < 1 for all n and k:
According to Theorem 2 of Liew (1976), when the sample size T is large enough, ^T is
equal to the coe¢ cient estimates obtained from the following least squares linear regression
problem with the equality constraint only
Q = QI   + ; (19)
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1:
The exact formula for the equality-constrained least squares estimator can be found in
Amemiya (1985) page 21. Since the equality constraint holds with respect to the true
parameter values, it is standard to prove that under Assumptions 3 to 5, the equality-
constrained least squares estimator is consistent. (The proof is similar to the proof for the
consistency of the OLS estimator, and hence I omit it here for brevity.) Since ^T is equal
to a consistent estimator when the sample size is large enough, ^T itself is also consistent.
Case 2 : Suppose that the inequality constraint 0   (kjn)  1 is binding at one end with
respect to the true parameter values for some n and k. Without loss of generality, consider
a simplest case in which  (1j1) = 0 and 0 <  (kjn) < 1 for all other pairs of n and k: The
proofs for other cases are parallel.
Let ^T (1j1) denote the estimate of  (1j1) obtained from the least squares regression
problem (8) corresponding to a sample with size T: The inequality constraint implies
^T (1j1)  0: Then, for each T > 0 I have the following two subcases.
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Subcase 2.1 : Suppose that ^T (1j1) > 0: In this scenario, ^T is equal to the coe¢ cient
estimates obtained from the following constrained least squares regression
Q = QI   + ;
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
  1NK ;
 (kjn)  0; 8n; k unless n = k = 1:
Notice that the inequality constraint  (1j1)  0 can be dropped because it is not binding
(^T (1j1) > 0) and because I have a convex problem (convex objective function and compact
domain). Theorem 2 of Liew (1976) indicates that when T is large enough, ^T is equal
to the equality-constrained least squares estimator obtained from (19), which converges to
the true parameter values  when the sample size approaches innity.
Subcase 2.2 : Suppose that ^T (1; 1) = 0: In this scenario, ^T is equal to the coe¢ cient
estimates obtained from the following constrained least squares regression
Q = QI   + ;
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
 (1j1) = 0;
  1NK ;
 (kjn)  0; 8n; k unless n = k = 1:
According to Theorem 2 of Liew (1976), when T is large enough, ^T is equal to the coef-
cient estimates obtained from conducting the following regression problem with equality
constraints only
Q = QI   + ;
s:t:
  1K1 = 1N1;
 (1j1) = 0:
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As in Case 1, since the equality constraints hold with respect to the true parameter values,
the estimator from this equality-constrained problem converges to  when the sample size
approaches innity.
The analyses of the above two subcases show that in Case 2, the sequence of estimatorsn
^T
o
T
can be viewed as consisting of two subsequences (each corresponding to one of the
two subcases), both of which converge to the same true parameter values  as the sample
size approaches innity. Therefore, the sequence
n
^T
o
T
as a whole must also converge to
:
Cases 1 and 2 together complete the proof.
Appendix B
As mentioned in Section 4.1, two technical issues need to be dealt with for the empirical
estimation of the asset return distribution qt;t+1.
First, the estimation of the risk-neutral CDF (5) relies on di¤erentiating the option price
with respect to the strike price. Unfortunately, we are generally not able to obtain a close-
form expression for this derivative. To resolve this issue, I resort to a linear approximation
based on two points X  and X+ around the strike price X of interest, i.e.,
F (X)  erf Put (X
+)  Put (X )
X+  X  :
For all empirical applications in the paper, I choose X  and X+ to be $0.01 to the left
and right of X:
A second empirical challenge has to do with obtaining European option prices. Nearly
all individual stock options are American options. While indices are typically represented
by European options, the market option prices are only available at discrete values of the
strike price and time to maturity. Thus, reasonable estimates are needed for European
option prices at any arbitrary point of interest. In the empirical applications, I adopt a
simple and commonly used approach in the literature (e.g., Shimko (1993), Malz (1997),
and Figlewski (2010)) of rst tting the implied volatility surface and then deriving the
option prices using the tted volatility. Specically, I start with the implied volatility of
all available options written on the asset on the date of estimation. Information on the
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implied volatility is provided by the OptionMetrics database, which is computed by the
BMS model for European options and by the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) model (Cox,
Ross and Rubinstein (1979)) for American options. I then t the implied volatility surface
for a range of strike prices and maturities of interest based on the implied volatility of
available options. Finally, I plug the tted volatility at any particular point back into the
BMS pricing model to obtain an estimation of the European option price.
I t the implied volatility surface by kernel smoothing using a procedure similar to
that adopted by the OptionMetrics database. On each date of estimation, I collect market
pricing information of all options written on the same underlying asset indexed by h =
1; 2; : : : ;H: For each option h, let h represent the implied volatility, and let V h be the
vega of the option (which measures the sensitivity of option price to the volatility). Denote
by mnh = Xh=St the moneyness of the option, by mth the time to maturity in years, and
by cph a dummy variable that equals 0 for call options and 1 for put options. Then at
any point with moneyness mo (within the range of moneyness of available options), time
to maturity ma (within the range of time to maturity of available options), and call-put
indicator cp; the estimated volatility ^ takes the form
^ (mn;mt; cp) =
PH
h=1 V
hh	
 
mn  mnh;mt  mth; cp   cphPH
h=1 V
h	 (mn  mnh;mt  mth; cp   cph) ; (20)
where the kernel function 	 is given by
	 (x; y; z) =
1p
2
exp

  x
2
2c1
  y
2
2c2
  z
2
2c3

:
I naively choose c1 = c2 = c3 = 0:001: These parameter values have been checked to
generate reasonable tting.
The idea of the kernel smoothing procedure is intuitive. At any point of interest, I
estimate volatility as the weighted average of the implied volatility of all observed options,
where observations close to the point of interest in terms of moneyness, time to maturity,
and the call-put indicator are assigned higher weights than observations far away. In
addition, since I am eventually interested in estimating the option prices, I would also
want to assign higher weights to observed options whose prices have higher sensitivity to
the volatility. To this end, I also include the option vega into the weights.
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The kernel smoothing formula (20) works for moneyness and time to maturity levels
within the range of available options. In my empirical applications, I mostly focus on
rare disasters. To estimate the risk-neutral probabilities of rare disasters, I need European
option prices (and hence the volatility) around the disaster thresholds, which feature very
low moneyness levels, sometime even outside the range of moneyness for available options.
When the moneyness at the disaster threshold is lower than the lowest observed moneyness
of available options, I estimate volatility at the lowest observed moneyness level by (20)
and use it as a proxy for the volatility around the disaster threshold.
Finally, notice from (20) that to perform kernel smoothing, besides the moneyness and
time to maturity of interest, I also need to specify the call-put indicator cp. Theoretically,
the implied volatility should be identical for a call option and a put option with the same
moneyness and time to maturity. However, this is rarely the case in reality. A priori, it
is not clear whether I should use the call or the put value for the estimation. In practice,
most options trade at-the-money (ATM) or out-of-the-money (OTM), rendering the prices
more accurate for ATM and OTM options. I thus adopt the following rule of thumb. When
the moneyness of interest is lower than one (mn < 1), I estimate volatility for the put
option (cp = 1); which trades OTM. When the moneyness of interest is higher than one
(mn > 1), I estimate volatility for the call option (cp = 0); which again trades OTM.
When the moneyness of interest is equal to one (mn = 1); both the call and the put
options are exactly ATM. I then estimate volatilities for both the call and the put options
and take the average.
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Figure 1: Second Moment Properties in Joint Return Behavior
This gure plots the returns of two pairs of hypothetical securities. Both pairs predict the same conditional
mean return of one security given the return of the other. However, the second-moment patterns of the two pairs
are distinct in the sense that the rst pair has increasing correlation when the returns become lower, whereas the
second pair has symmetric correlation in the entire region of returns.
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Figure 2: Nonlinearity in Joint Return Behavior
This gure plots the returns of two hypothetical assets against the market return. The returns of both assets t
the same linear relation with the market return. However, asset 1 is more sensitive to the market disaster risk than
asset 2 in the sense that it tends to deliver lower returns when the market return becomes extremely low.
56
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Disaster Risk Variables
This table reports summary statistics of the disaster risk variables for the time period from 1996 to 2011. For the
systematic disaster risk (SysDis) and the unconditional disaster risk (Dis) of individual assets, I compute in each
year the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation of each variable, and I report in the table the mean, median,
minimum, and maximum of the annual cross-sectional mean as well as the mean of the annual cross-sectional standard
deviation. For the market disaster risk (DisM ), the table reports the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum,
and maximum of the variable over the sample period.
Variable Mean of Mean of Median of Min of Max of
annual mean annual S.D. annual mean annual mean annual mean
SysDis 0.3346 0.3643 0.2886 0.1164 0.6910
Dis 0.0314 0.0377 0.0295 0.0112 0.0577
Variable Mean S.D. Median Min Max
DisM 0.0131 0.0100 0.0123 0.0015 0.0329
57
Table 2: Pairwise Correlations of Stock Characteristics
This table reports pairwise correlation coe¢ cients of various stock characteristics for the time period from 1996
to 2011. The stock characteristics include the systematic disaster risk (SysDis), unconditional disaster risk (Dis),
CAPM beta (Beta), coskewness (Coskew), book-to-market ratio (B2M), and illiquidity (IlliqMA).
SysDis Dis Beta Coskew B2M IlliqMA
SysDis 1
Dis 0.4048 1
Beta 0.1353 0.1104 1
Coskew -0.0604 -0.0323 0.0150 1
B2M 0.0123 0.0248 0.0050 -0.0112 1
IlliqMA -0.0236 0.1044 0.0227 -0.0210 0.0251 1
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Table 3: Systematic Disaster Risk Premium for Entire Sample
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth test results of the cross-sectional risk premium associated with systematic
disaster risk (SysDist 1) for the time period from 1997 to 2012. The test controls for a variety of risk factors,
including the unconditional disaster risk (Dist 1), CAPM beta (Betat 1), coskewness (Coskewt 1), size (Sizet 1),
book-to-market ratio (B2Mt 1), lagged return (Rett 1), and illiquidity (IlliqMAt 1). The t-statistics are reported
in the parentheses below the corresponding estimates. Asterisks denote statistical signicance at the 1% (***), 5%
(**) and 10% (*) levels.
Variable (1) (2)
SysDist 1 0.0040 0.0017
(1.06) (0.84)
Dist 1 0.0261
(0.46)
Betat 1 -0.0107
(-1.41)
Coskewt 1 -2104.67
(-0.81)
Sizet 1 -0.0011
(-1.16)
B2Mt 1 -0.0001
(-0.80)
Rett 1 -0.0222
(-2.60)**
IlliqMAt 1 0.0308
(1.17)
Constant 0.0063 0.0333
(1.81)* (1.73)*
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Table 4: Systematic Disaster Risk Premium and Market Disaster Risk
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth test results of the cross-sectional risk premium associated with systematic
disaster risk (SysDist 1) for subsamples constructed based on the market disaster risk estimated from the previous
year (DisMt 1). Columns 1 and 2 report results for the subsample with Dis
M
t 1 below the rst quartile, columns 3
and 4 correspond to the subsample with DisMt 1 between the rst and the second quartiles, columns 5 and 6 report
results for the subsample with DisMt 1 between the second and the third quartiles, and columns 7 and 8 restrict the
test to the subsample with DisMt 1 above the third quartile. The test controls for a variety of risk factors, including
the unconditional disaster risk (Dist 1), CAPM beta (Betat 1), coskewness (Coskewt 1), size (Sizet 1), book-to-
market ratio (B2Mt 1), lagged return (Rett 1), and illiquidity (IlliqMAt 1). The t-statistics are reported in the
parentheses below the corresponding estimates. Asterisks denote statistical signicance at the 1% (***), 5% (**)
and 10% (*) levels.
Variable Low DisMt 1 2 3 High Dis
M
t 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SysDist 1 -0.0012 0.0013 -0.0042 -0.0060 -0.0080 -0.0056 0.0293 0.0172
(-0.26) (0.48) (-0.53) (-1.73)* (-1.06) (-1.59) (3.57)*** (3.18)***
Dist 1 -0.0674 0.0852 -0.1657 0.2523
(-0.76) (0.68) (-1.23) (2.77)***
Betat 1 -0.0080 -0.0113 -0.0139 -0.0098
(-1.16) (-0.61) (-0.90) (-0.55)
Coskewt 1 -1.0652.98 1321.01 -26.07 939.38
(-1.12) (0.37) (-0.01) (0.92)
Sizet 1 0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0034
(0.76) (-0.67) (-0.27) (-1.78)*
B2Mt 1 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 0.0001
(0.59) (-0.58) (-2.56)** (0.55)
Rett 1 -0.0052 -0.0486 -0.0137 -0.0213
(-0.38) (-2.30)** (-0.72) (-1.62)
IlliqMAt 1 0.0628 0.0449 0.0367 -0.0210
(2.43)** (0.84) (0.71) (-0.29)
Constant 0.0085 0.0030 -0.0004 0.0305 0.0024 0.0272 0.0148 0.0728
(1.73)* (0.13) (-0.04) (0.77) (0.33) (0.65) (2.55)** (1.57)
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Table 5: Systemic Exposure of Banks
This table reports the systemic exposure (SysExp) of the 24 current constituent banks of the KBW Bank Index
computed for the time period from 1996 to 2012. Due to missing option prices for some banks during some periods
of my sample, the e¤ective estimation period may di¤er from bank to bank.
Bank Name SysExp
BB&T Corporation 0.7636
Bank of America Corp 0.9881
Capital One Financial Corp 0.9789
JPMorgan Chase & Co 0.6860
Citigroup 0.9880
Comerica Inc 0.9925
Commerce Bancshares Inc 0.1164
Cullen/Frost Bankers Inc 0.2079
Fifth Third Bancorp 0.9865
First Niagara Financial Group 0.2534
U.S. Bancorp 0.8038
Huntington Bancshares Inc 0.9907
KeyCorp 0.9883
M&T Bank Corporation 0.7331
Bank of New York Mellon 0.7632
New York Community Bank 0.5715
Northern Trust Corp 0.4948
PNC Financial Services Group 0.7805
Peoples United Financial Inc 0.1553
Regions Financial Corporation 0.9852
State Street Corporation 0.8056
SunTrust Banks Inc 0.9919
Wells Fargo & Company 0.9912
Zions Bancorporation 0.9831
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Table 6: Systemic Exposure and Bank Characteristics
This table reports the coe¢ cient estimates from regressing the systemic exposure (SysExp) of the 24 current
constituent banks of the KBW Bank Index on lagged values of various bank characteristics for the time period from
1996 to 2012. The systemic exposure is computed for each bank at the end of each month using option prices of
the most recent 90 business days. The bank characteristics include market beta (Beta), sector beta (BetaS) equity
return volatility (V ol), leverage ratio (Lever), market-to-book ratio (M2B), log market capitalization (Size), non-
interest to interest income ratio (N2I), ratio of total demand deposits to total book value of assets (MatMis1), and
ratio of total interest-bearing deposits to total book value of assets (MatMis2). Column 1 reports the regression
results without xed e¤ects, column 2 controls for the bank-xed e¤ects, and column 3 controls for both bank- and
year-xed e¤ects. The t-statistics are reported in the parentheses below the corresponding estimates. Asterisks
denote statistical signicance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Betat 1 -0.0023 0.0112 0.0587
(-0.07) (0.32) (2.54)**
BetaSt 1 0.2196
(4.35)***
V olt 1 6.5414 5.4125 4.1575 3.1228
(6.20)*** (6.10)*** (2.97)*** (2.29)**
Levert 1 0.0054 -0.0003 -0.0077 -0.0088
(0.93) (-0.04) (-0.89) (-1.12)
M2Bt 1 0.0395 0.0547 0.0258 0.0270
(2.99)*** (3.55)*** (0.81) (0.90)
Sizet 1 0.0349 -0.0581 -0.0739 -0.0574
(2.25)** (-1.73) (-1.81)* (-1.45)
N2It 1 0.0199 0.0480 0.0974 0.1019
(0.79) (1.84)* (3.02)*** (3.29)***
MatMis1t 1 -0.1616 -0.3353 0.5214 0.4235
(-0.71) (-1.10) (1.25) (1.13)
MatMis2t 1 -0.2059 0.1767 0.0183 0.0421
(-0.88) (0.60) (0.07) (0.16)
Constant -0.4852 0.9277 1.1158 0.7549
(-1.16) (1.47) (1.54) (1.07)
Bank-xed e¤ects N Y Y Y
Year-xed e¤ects N N Y Y
Number of observations 3123 3123 3123 3123
R-squared 0.1092 0.1371 0.2141 0.2205
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